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NOTES
THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SUPPORT ACT
1.

INTRODUCTION

The family is still the basic unit of American society. Its
solidarity is built on the ties of mutual affection growing out
of a common intellectual, moral and physical inheritance.' But
when these ties fail to bind, the law must lend its aid. One of
the most tangible ways for law to preserve the family is by
the creation and enforcement of duties of support.' With the
passage of time, the duties of support which the common law
imposed on the father have been extended by statute to include adopted and illegitimate children' and even to those in
4
whom he stands in loco parentis.
The duties of the husband
to support the wife have been made more stringent by giving
her the right to sue for separate maintenance,' the right to
compel him to pay suit money,' and other rights flowing from
statutes on such collateral matters as homestead,' family allowance,' workmen's compensation' and wills." As an example
of these extensions in North Dakota it has been held that a
husbandly father has the duty to support his wife and children
even though the wife's well-to-do relatives might see that they
did not starve, and also that the husband has a duty of support to his family that is prior to making arrangements for
payment of his debts.' Also a father's duty to support his
family has been held to supersede the use of his own income
for his own living expenses." There has been a general ineffectiveness in approaching the problem of how to handle enforce1. For a general discussion of the importance of the family, see Elliott
and Merrill, Social Disorganization ch. 1.
2. Under the early common law the wife did not have the ability to
see court action.
3. Vernier, AMERICAN PAMILY LAW § 234.
4. In re Lutz' Estate 107 N.Y.S. 2d 388, 392 (1951); Brody v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp., 145 Pa. 602, 21 A.2d 437, 438 (1951).
5. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-26 (1961); accord, Savre v. Savre, 77 N.D. 242,
42 NW. 2d 642 (1950).
6. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-23 (1961), but see Bailey v. Bailey, 22 N.D.
553, 134 N.W. 747 (1912).
7. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-25 (1961); accord, Rosholt v. Mehus, 3 N.D.
513, 57 N.W. 783 (1894).
8. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-24 (1961); accord, Williams v. Williams, 70
N.D. 278, 293 N.W. 802 (1940); see also; Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290, 133
N.W. 1035 (1911).
9. N.D. Cent. Code § 65-05-21 (1961).
10. N.D. Cent. Code § 15-04.09, 10 (1961).
11. Heller v. Heller, 81 N.W. 2d 124 (N.D. 1957).
12. Rice v. Rice, 87 N.W. 2d 408 (Neb. 1958).
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ment of support when the father had abandoned the family
and fled the jurisdiction of the domicile court." This is constitutionally a state problem, 4 and so the problem was first
effectively undertaken by the legislature of New York
which passed the UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAW
in 1949." The next year after a review of the general problem,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws
drafted tie UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
ACT. By 1955 all jurisdictions had passed the act as well as
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands." In North Dakota
it was first put on the books by the 1951 legislature," and its
present form is in section 14-12 of the North Dakota Century
Code. Its use in the larger counties of the state has been of a
limited nature," but with the expected population increase in
the next few years are a few points of interpretation that
should be dealt with.
The purpose of the Act in general is to improve and extend,
by reciprocal legislation, the enforcement of dut'es of support
and to make uniform the law with respect thereto.' With the
increasing mobility of the American population the problem
of interstate enforcement of duties of support became acute.
A deserting husband was beyond the reach of process in the
state where he had abandoned his family and the family had
no means of following him. Welfare departments, saddled with
the burden of supporting destitute families, were often prevented from enforcing the duties of support by decisions holding that the duty existed only as to the obligee within the
state of the complaint. Thus the primary function of the Act
was, and still is, to obtain support from a deserting father
irrespective of his domicile.2'
2.

EXTRADITION CONSIDERATIONS

Part of the actual enforcement of the Act is by criminal
13. The Council of State Governments stated in their manual, The Support of Dependent Wives and Children that there is no effective civil remedy to enforce the support of abandoned wives or children where a
father absconds to another state.
14. U. S. Const. Amend. IV provides that powers not delegated to the
United States government are reserved to the states and there is no mention of the present problem.
15. 65 McKinneys Cons. Laws of N.Y. § 2111 et seq. It is not inferred
that other legislation did not preceed this law but only that this was the
first gleaning of a two-state suit.
16. 9C U.L.A.
17. 9C U.L.A. (Pocket Supp. 1955 p. 68-69).
18. N.D. Sess. Laws, Ch. 122 (1951).
19. Interview with Carlton Nelson, Grand Forks County States Attorney
and Richard Boulger, Cass County Assistant States Attorney.
20. 9C U.L.A. 3 (prefatory note).
21. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-12-01 (1961).
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procedure. Though a civil remedy is provided," the framers of
the Act felt that the threat of actual extradition would. be a
powerful weapon in the case of shiftless obligors. However
the interpretation of the two criminal provisions" have caused
great diversity of application. Section 5 of the Act reads as
follows:
"Interstate Rendition-The goyernor of this state may
demand from the governor of any other state the surrender of any person found in such other state who is
charged in this state with the crime of failing to support
any person in this state and may surrender on demand
by the governor of any other state any person found in
this state who is charged in such other state with the
crime of failing to provide for the support of a person in
such other state."
Section 6 of the Act reads as follows:
"Relief from the above Provisions-Any obligor contemplated by section 14-12-05 who submits to the jurisdiction of the court of such other state and complies with
the court's order of support, shall be relieved of extradition for desertion or nonsupport entered in the court's
of this state during the pericd of such compliance."
Four appellate courts have been confronted with the interprctation of these two sections.' The problem is whether or not the
obligor can defeat the extradition proceedings of the obligee
instituting the ex parte proceedings on his own rather than
allowing the obligee to do it. Two courts granted jurisdiction, '
and two refused it. 2 All four courts were interpreting identical
statutes" and North Dakota's is identical also.' In each of
these cases the petitioner-obligor contended that the obligor
could initiate proceedings in a court of the responding state
and thereby voluntarily submit himself to the court's jurisdiction and upon compliance with that court's order of support
be relieved of extradition.' The California court rejected the
obligor's contention on the grounds that the Support Act sets
22. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-12-07-25 (1961).
23. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-12-05-06 (1961).
24. Florida, Oregon, California, and Ohio.
25. Jackson v. Hall, 97 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957); Lefler v. Lefler, 344 P.2d 754
(Ore. 1959).
26. Ex Parte Floyd, 43 Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954); Sands v. Sands,
136 N.E. 2d 747 (Ohio 1956).
27. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1160-61 (1955); Ohio Rev. Stat. Ann. § 88.061.071 (1959 Supp); Fla. State. Ann. § 88.061-.071 (1959 Supp.); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 110.051-.061 (1953).
28. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-21-05-05 (1961).
29. See footnote 25 supra.
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out two alternatives to be followed ;' namely, actual extradition, or initiation of civil proceedings in the initiating state
by the obligee. The latter alternative was interpreted via section 2 of the Act by saying that the phrase "any other state"
as used in section 6 was "any state in which proceeding pursuant to the proceeding in the initiating state is or may be
commenced."'" The Ohio court followed this same general line
of reasoning. "
This is an extremely strict interpretation of the Act in my
opinion and it seems the courts of Florida and Oregon reached
a much more equitable verdict. In Jackson v. Hall 'the Flor.
ida court allowed the obligor to comply with a support order
made ex partein the responding state and thus avoided extradition. Though they altered the definition of responding
state as stated in the Act" their reasoning was as follows: The
court felt that the purpose of the support act in both its civil
and criminal aspects was to compel the obligor to support his
dependents and not primarily to subject him to criminal
punishment for his past offenses, and therefore there was
no valid reason for refusing jurisdiction." As to the procedural dearth in the Act in relation to this interpretation the
Oregon court said, "It may be that the draftsmen of the Act,
in recognition of the fact that families do not come to the
critical juncture which is portrayed in the plaintiff's petition,
in the absence of something abnormal, inserted in Section 6
of the Act so that the obligor can be relived from extradition
if he wishes to stay where he has found employment and contribute to the support of his obligees a sum which the court
rules is reasonable."'' Also in the case of Ex Parte Floyd,'
Justice Schauer's dissent states, "...
the courts are not powerless to devise a fair and appropriate procedure to be followed
and one which would permit the evidence of the obligee to be
as fully presented to our courts as would be the case if the support proceedings are initiated in the home state of the obligee
and followed by supplementary proceedings in California (the
responding state)."
30. Ev parte Floyd, 43 Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954).
31. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-12-02 (3) (1961).
32. Sands v. Sands, 136 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio 1956).
33. Jackson v. Hall, 97 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
34. This is the interpretation of N.D. Cent. Code § 14-12-02 (3)
allowing proceedings to begin in the asylum or responding state.
35. See footnote 33 supra at 7.
36. Lefler v. Lefler, 344 P.2d 754, 763 (Ore. 1959).
37. See footnote 30 supra at 823 (parentheses mine).
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One criticism of this interpretation is pointed out by Professor Brockelbank in his book Interstate Enforcement of Family Support." As previously stated, the threat of extradition
as provided for in the Act was to be a deterrent to deserting
fathers. However if the threat is to be real there must be an
ability to jail the shiftless obligor who refuses to meet his
obligations. I respectfully agree that the Florida and Oregon
decisions take the "bite" out of the extradition provisions, but
isn't the overriding purpose of the Act to provide for support
of a dependent family? And if this is so how can you further
this goal by removing an obligor from an asylum state causing
him to lose what occupation he has obtained and thereby reduce his monetary ability to provide for support payments.
3.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

There is another facet of the Act that has been the cause
of judicial interpretation in our neighboring state of Minnesota. They have added to their Uniform Act an amendment'
that allows the conduct of the obligee to relieve the obligor
from his duty of support. This is not such a radical departure
from the ordinary Act; in fact it seems quite reasonable, but
their use of it is a bit overextended. In State of Ill. ex rel.
Shannon v. Sterling," the court held that a husband did not
have to pay support payments to his family because the wife
had removed them from the state and thus deprived the husband of his visitation rights. The courts rely heavily on the liberal construction given to the statute.' They said, "If the Act
is to accomplish its purpose it must be given a liberal and flexible construction and application so that it may be adapted to
the particular circumstances of the case."4 The court then, in
the second part of its holding, said that the husband was not
relieved of future payments if the trial court amends the
divorce decree as to visitation rights. Thus in effect the court
has allowed the alteration of a divorce decree through a support hearing and using the scope of the Act as its authority.
The fact that a wife does not comply strictly with the provi38. Brocklebank, Interstate Enforcement of Family Support p. 21 (1960).
39. Minn. Stat. Ann. 518.44 (1) (1960).
40. 248 Minn. 266, 80 N.W.2d 13 (1956).
41. Wheatley v. Mueller, 288 S.W.2d 405, 409 (1956) which stated that
without violating its language the act is to be construed to solve the problem of evil for which it is designed and to this end all reasonable doubts
are to be resolvedjn favor of the applicability of the act to the particular
case.
42. See footnote 40 supra at p. 22.
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sions of a divorce decree, 3 or even takes the child to live with
her in another state" has been held to not effect the duty of
the father's support under case law prior to the enactment of
the Uniform Act. In fact some cases held that after custody
of the children has been taken away from the father by a
divorce decree he has no right to dictate their residence, or
refuse to pay support money because they are taken out of
his jurisdiction 5 thereby defeating the visitation rights of the
father."'
Why should we be concerned with a problem of this type?
As was pointed out in the preceding section on extradition proceedings, the legislative intent and procedural stipulations in
the Act have a relative bearing on its use. The Minnesota
court strained to allow the alteration of a divorce decree under
the Act but have extended its interpretation further. In the
case of Holmes v. Holmes," the court found that the husband's lack of payment was studied, contemptuous, and deliberate and thus enforced the payments as well as suspended
the visitation rights. What then is the scope and function of
the Act? Is it to effect the payment of support from deserting
fathers as stated in the introduction or is it to be judicially
interpreted in the field of domestic relations to alter and affect divorce decrees. The answer seems self-evident.
In general a great many of the complications that arise under this Act have been obviated by the action of the Uniform
Commissioners when they drafted an amendment in 1958."
This is a great help since it spells out much more clearly the
procedures as well as the interpretations to be used when
working with the Act. However the process of incorporating
it into all of the jurisdictions may be slow in coming, so an
awareness of the aforementioned problems may be of some
benefit for a time to come.
JAMES H. B. DILLARD

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

(1960).

Kelly v. Kelly, 38 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1942).
Kane v. Kane, 241 Mich. 96, 216 N.W. 437 (1927).
Leighton v. Leighton, 48 R. I. 195. 136 A. 443 (1927).
Altschuler v. Altschuler, 248 N.Y.S. 93 (1931).
Holmes v. Holmes, 255 Minn. 270, 96 N.W.2d 547, 555 (1959).
Brocklebank, Interstate Enforcement of Family Support, App.

1.
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APPENDIX

1.

PROCEDURE FOR IN-STATE ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
1. Ascertainment of the father's neglect of his duty of support.
2. Issuance of a neglect of child or family complaint.
3. Arrest by a judges warrant.
4. Defendant enters his plea:
a. If not guilty bail is set and the case held for trial.
b. If guilty then:
(1) Determination if the husband is capable of support.
(2) Wife is subpoenaed and her financial condition is established.
(3) The court usually sentences the defendant to one year in the
County Jail which is suspended if he pays a certain amount
into the court for the support of his family. The money is dispersed by the clerk of court and if the husband fails to comply
with the order a bench warrant is issued for his arrest.
PROCEDURE FOR USE OF THE URESA WITH NORTH DAKOTA
AS THE INITIATING STATE
1. The initiating state petitions its court for an order that states a person residing in another state has a duty to support dependents in
this state.
2. General procedure followed:
a. Petitioner fills out the petition before a notary public.
b. Testimony of the petitioner is taken.
c. Certificate of the court is prepared.
d. If the petitioner cannot pay the filing fee an affidavit is prepared
stating such and an order is prepared for. the judge's signature
waiving the filing fee.
e. The states attorney then arranges a meeting with the judge who
requires that the testimony be taken and sworn to in his presence.
f. The papers are then filed in quadruplicate with the clerk of the
District Court who forwards three copies to the court having jurisdiction over the defendant.
g. The court also forwards a certified copy of our Act.
h. You then file a paupers affidavit if necessary.
i. As a practical matter you request a waiver of the filing fee in
the responding state to save our petitioner the expense.
j. Notice of the issuance of the support order of the responding state
is sent to you from them.
PROCEDURE FOR USE OF THE URESA WITH NORTH DAKOTA
AS THE RESPONDING STATE
1. Upon receipt of the papers from the initiating state the following
procedure is used.
a. Issuance of a summons and delivery to a sheriff for service.
b. A hearing is held and the testimony of the defendant is heard.
c. The judge determines the payments that are to be made.
d. The order is served on the defendant who then makes his pay49. For a more detailed discussion of procedure see Boulger, Non-Support and Related Matters, a paper given at the 1960 States Attorney's Convention in Grand Forks.
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ments either to the responding state court or directly to the petitioner.
e. Failure to comply with the order constitutes contempt.
Comments:
Procedurally speaking the act falls short of perfection in its scope. For
instance, the defendant can only be forced to provide support as long
as he is in the jurisdiction of the responding state. Also there is no provision for the location of the father by the responding state unless the
petitioner can give a good lead as to his whereabouts. Some states have
obviated the latter problem though by setting up a separate division of
their State's Attorney's offices specifically to deal with support matters.'

50.

Ibid.

